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THESIS ABSTRACT: 
Nietzsche on Truth and Overcoming traces the 
development of Friedrich Nietzsche's epistemic criticism. 
Nietzsche's outright denial of the existence of truth is 
grounded in his claim that stable metaphysical entities do 
not exist . The following inquiry examines Nietzsche's 
method of doubting which compels him to dismiss "being" as a 
fictitious "perspectival falsification". 
Nietzsche's denial of the reality of pre-existent 
"being" creates problems with communicating what he means 
through normal language. Nietzsche on Truth and Ov ercoming 
elucidates the problems which Nietzsche creates through his 
uprooting of being and provides Nietzsche's hint as to where 
mankind might still look for the "most real", in art. 
Through his conception of the Dionysian artist, Nietzsche 
offers us the tragic annihilator of the "all-too-human" 
fictions of linguistic truth. This thesis thereby concludes 
that the Dionysian artist is Nietzsche's "answer" to 
epistemology, for the tragic wisdom of the Dionysian 
provides a glimpse into primal reality precisely because he 
affirms existence in spite of not knowing fiction as the 
logical opposite of truth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this paper will be concerned primarily 
with Nietzsche's criticism of epistemology and his appraisal 
of truth. For a thorough consideration of Nietzsche's 
inquiry into the status of truth, it will be necessary to 
examine Ni e tzsche's conception of language and its relation 
to metaphysics. Insofar as Nietzsche characterizes truth as 
a "species of falsity", this thesis will disclose 
Nietzsche's conception of the aesthetic dimension of truth. 
A large portion of this project will thus be oriented around 
the grounding of Nietzsche's claims concerning "the truth 
about truth" and th~ reality of reality. It will also be 
prudent to inquire into the status of "truth values" and 
"moral values" and the status which both of these "values" 
hold in Nietzsche's philosophy. All of this should only be 
done, however, after a brief preface regarding the sources 
of Nietzsche's thought. 
The body of Nietzsche's thought on epistemology comes 
to us in: 
A. the books which Nietzsche himself published or 
intended to publish: 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872) (BT) 
Human, All too Human (1878) (HA) 
The Dawn (1881) (D) 
~he Gay Science (1882) (GS) 
-'<>Thus Spake Zara 'thus t ra ( 18 8 3 - 8 5) ( z) 
Beyond Good and Evil (1886) (BGE) 
The Genealogy of Morals (1887) (GM) 
- The Antichrist (18f38) (published in 1895) (A) 
Twilight of the Idols (1888) (published in 1889) 
(TI) 
1 
B. Other works published: 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873) 
(PTG) 
On Truth and Falsity (1873) (TF) 
C. The material from Nietzsche's notebooks published as 
The Will To Power. 
While different scholars have placed various amounts of 
weight on the above "categories" in interpreting Nietzsche's 
1 
thought, I think it is most appropriate to rely on the books 
which Nietzsche published (or wanted to publish) as the best 
way of gauging his philosophic activity. There has been a 
plenitude of misinterpretation and outright misrepre-
sent at ion of Nietzsche's thought in the recent past. The 
most outlandish is the Nazi's adoption of Nietzsche as their 
party-philosopher through the "scholarship" of Baumler who 
relied predominantly on fragments from Nietzsche's un-
published notes. It is doubtful that Nietzsche, who 
asserted that "The anti-semite lies as a matter of 
principle", could have been so distorted, however, without 
the meddling of his sister, Elisabeth. 
1 
For citation purposes, note that the aforementioned 
abbreviations will be used with the appropriate book or 
chapter numbers in Roman numerals and the appropriate 
section numbers in arabic numerals; e.g. Thus Spake 
Zarathustra, Book 2, section 12, = (Z II 12); citations from 
On Truth and Falsity will be from page numbers, as this 
essay is not conveniently divided into sections. Textual 
citation from other authors will be noted in a similar way, 
but I will use the author's name in lieu of the title, with 
the appropriate page number(s). 
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Elisabeth Nietzsche intentionally held up publication 
of Ecce Homo and The Antichrist. Seeking to build herself 
up as the sole spokesperson for her "beloved brother's" 
philosophy and further her "cultural" status in Germany in 
the 1920's and 30's, she portrayed Friedrich Nietzsche as an 
anti-semite thereby lending "philosophic" support to her 
political aspirations of anti-semitism both in Germany and 
in Paraguay (Kaufmann p. 43). Elisabeth went so far as to 
claim The Will to Power was Nietzsche's crowning philosophic 
achievement, when it was only an assemblage of his 
unpublished notes which she took the liberty of editing and 
doctoring. 
Walter Kaufmann cites Elisabeth Nietzsche as 
propagating a tremendous amount of misconception about her 
brother's work, some recognized, but much also unrecognized 
even through the late 1970's. Fortunately, for the present 
inquiry, Elisabeth Nietzsche's role as meddler has not so 
much affected our access to his thoughts on epistemology as 
it has on social ethics. Still, it should be noted that The 
Will To Power was not completed nor planned to be published 
by Nietzsche himself but is only a large collection of 
Nietzsche's roughly organized notes, much of which lacks the 
polished quality of his finished works. The Will To Power 
does, however, contain helpful and illuminating thoughts on 
epistemology which complement Nietzsche's published books; 
one should nonetheless be careful in ascribing isolated 
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thoughts contained in The Will to Power to Nietzsche's 
mature positions, as we simply do not know the 
reasons why Nietzsche chose not to develop further and 
publish some of his thoughts contained in these notes. 
Perhaps Nietzsche chose to abandon or omit some of this 
material from the works which he published himself because 
he was not satisfied with the content. This is not to 
suggest that a categorical disclaimer should preface The 
Will to Power for the interpretation of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. Rather, it is only to suggest that we notice 
the way which we have come to have these notes and to 
proceed with caution, always looking for evidence in 
Nietzsche's own published texts for complementary support of 
its thought content. Through this way of reading, we can 
hopefully avoid attributing erroneous epistemic stances to 
Nietzsche. Some of The Will to Power could be, after all, 
unscrupulously fished out of Nietzsche's wastebasket. 
It is also appropriate to note Nietzsche's later 
critique of his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. In "A 
Critical Glance Backward", Nietzsche attacks his firstborn: 
as I look at it today my treatise strikes me as 
quite impossible. It is poorly written, heavy handed, 
ernbarrassing ... it lacks logical nicety and is so sure of 
its message that it dispenses with any kind of proof. 
(BT later preface III) 
Further: 
I fumbled along, using terms borrowed from the 
vocabularies of Kant and Schopenhauer to express value 
judgements which were in flagrant contradiction to these 
men! (BT later preface VI) 
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Evidencing this "flagrant contradiction" we have Nietzsche 
describing music as the bridge to the noumena: 
music is distinguished from all the other arts by 
the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, 
more accurately, the adequate objectivity of the will, 
but is the direct copy of the will itself, and therefore 
represents the metaphysical of everything physical in 
the world, and the thing-in-itself of every phenomenon. 
(BT XVI) 
Sometime in 1873 (between On Truth and Lie and Philosophy 1n 
the Tragic Age of the Greeks), there is a major shift in 
Nietzsche's thinking about the thing-in-itself which I will 
trace in this paper, a shift which would later prompt 
Nietzsche to declare that the thing-in-itself is a 
contradictory notion. 
It is an important theme in this thesis that 
Nietzsche's thoughts on art remained constant insofar as 
Nietzsche considered art as "the most real". In The Birth 
of Tragedy, Nietzsche was precisely trying to proclaim art 
as the "most real" by ascribing to it the role of peeking 
into the noumenistic realm; when Nietzsche finally does 
dismiss the noumena as unreal by claiming "things" are 
contradictory, he is left with having no possibility for 
truth as correspondence. Nonetheless, we have the later 
Nietzsche still asserting "a Dionysian hope"; Nietzsche 
reaffirms his earlier claims for art as being the "most 
real", and truth itself becomes a "fable", a "fiction", a 
kind of art itself. One can therefore surmise that 
Nietzsche's thoughts on truth changed in the early 70's, but 
5 
-, ... 
his appraisal of art maintained its "mos t r ea l" s t atus 
throughout his writings. 
If one were to formulate a general outline of 
Nietzsche's epistemology based on The Birth of Tragedy 
alone, it would clash with the next nine books which 
Nietzsche intended for publication. In the following y ear, 
however, in his unpublished essay, On Truth and Falsity, 
Nietzsche gives us a clue in which direction his later 
thoughts would progress. This transition period reveals the 
seeds of Nietzsche's later propensity to attack the notions 
of what had before this time passed for "real being". 
Herein also lies evidence why Nietzsche believed humans are 
engaged in an ongoing "falsification" process. Through this 
process of imagining the existence of stable metaphysical 
entities, Nietzsche thinks man projects truth into 
existence. 
In On Truth and Falsity Nietzsche elucidates why he 
attacked the ground of the platonic form and the supposition 
that truth has the capacity to illuminate extra-
linguistically. I find no reason to discount this work in 
helping to explain Nietzsche's later criticisms and suspect 
that the only reasons why Nietzsche never published it 
himself were simply due to the facts that: 1) proposing 
nominalism was hardly an original philosophic enterprise in 
the 19th century; and 2) the essay itself is very short, 
less than twenty pages. 
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Due to Nietzsche's project of attacking what is 
presumed to be most real as a mere "fiction", we are often 
left with problems in trying to understand and communicate 
what Nietzsche means, for it is not always clear where we 
are left when Nietzsche aborts the metaphysics which are 
contained implicitly in language. This is not to suggest 
that Nietzsche simply undermines his own claims to truth by 
claiming "there is no truth" and is thus easily dismissed. 
Rather, the method of pointing to the lack of grounded 
"things" enables him to undermine the prerequisite entities 
needed for empirical truths to exist. This denial of 
logically grounded "things" provides an important 
cornerstone for the theme which pervades his thought: the 
fundamental dissonance of logico-linguistic thought to 
reality. 
In short, the emphasis of this project is to elucidate 
Nietzsche's thoughts on truth. Standing in the midst of the 
death of truth, Nietzsche's thinking and appraisal of 
reality reveals itself as a distinctly aesthetic worldview. 
Moreover, in Nietzsche's works we can find an obvious 
obsession with art both before and after his rejection of 
the noumena. It may be worthy of asking if all of 
Nietzsche's attacks on epistemology are not simply out of 
his pathos for art. While it would be interesting to 
explore this question, this lies beyond the margins of this 
project and we should rather start with Nietzsche's 
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dismissal of Descartes' cogito in chapter one. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SELF-OVERCOMING 
Generally we strive to acquire one emotional stance, 
one viewpoint for all life situations and events: we 
usually call that being of a philosophical frame of mind. 
But rather than making oneself uniform, we may find greater 
value for the enrichment of knowledge by listening to the 
soft voice of different life situations; each brings its own 
views with it. Thus we acknowledge and share the life and 
nature of many by not treating ourselves like rigid, 
invariable, single individuals--Human, All too Human (618) 
*** 
The aim of this chapt e r is to examine Nietzsche's 
approach to philosophical inquiry. Nietzsche's attack on 
epistemology is rooted in his appraisal of the nonexistence 
of stable metaphysical entities. This creates a problem 
with the meaning of "truth" and "falsity" in a fundamental 
sense. Nietzsche's philosophical method takes Descartes' 
method of doubting into a realm prior to metaphysics, 
wielding the discerning knife of a psychologist on Descartes 
himself and (in Nietzsche's case) on Nietzsche himself, 
dismissing [the ego/ the self/ the "I" / the subject] as a 
hollow, albeit useful, superstition and supposition for life 
and existence. 
The fact that one becomes what one is presupposes 
that one has not the remotest suspicion of what one is. 
(EH II 9) 
The ego is ... a "refined swindle", an "ideal". 
(EH III 5) 
The subject: this is the term for one belief in a 
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unity underlying all the different impulses of the 
highest feeling of reality: we understand this belief 
as the effect of one cause--we believe so firmly in our 
belief that for its sake we imagine "truth", "reality", 
"substantiality" in general--"The subject" is the 
fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of 
one substratum: but it is we who first created the 
"similarity" of these states; our adjusting them and 
making them similar is the fact, not their similarity 
(--which ought rather to be denied). (WP 485) 
Nietzsche asserts that the ego is a "useful falsifi-
cation", but it is hardly an inward or internal "fact" of 
consciousness by which we can reason to other alleged 
undoubtables. Nietzsche implies that "internal facts" are 
the result of confused thinking and they are not capable of 
existing even in principle. While the reality of the ego is 
a claim out of the "bosom of life", life is no proof for the 
reality of selfhood. Verily, if one did not believe in the 
reality of one's self, things would perhaps not go so 
well--one might wander into traffic or chew off one's own 
limbs. It seems very probable that without belief in the 
self, one could not take precautions to prevent one's own 
demise. Nietzsche thus recognizes the self as the oldest 
prejudice. It is a prejudice which is indispensible for 
lifecraft, yet hardly indispensible for philosophical 
inquiry. 
Nietzsche also identifies the profound influence that 
language has had in maintaining the fictitious "reality" of 
the self superstition: 
The inner world is full of phantoms and will-o-the 
wisps: the will is one of them ... And as for the ego. 
That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words. 
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(TI VI 3) 
Nietzsche, as philologist, still considers other paths of 
discourse for philosophy that might wrestle away the 
prejudices perpetrated by the more "biased" tongues: 
The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, 
and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. 
Where there is affinity of languages, it cannot fail, 
owing to a common philosophy of grammar--I mean owing to 
the unconscious domination and guidance by certain 
grammatical functions--that everything is prepared at 
the outset for a similar development and sequence of 
philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred 
against certain other possibilites of world-
interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers 
within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where 
the concept of the subject is least developed) look 
otherwise "into the world", and will be found on paths 
of thought different from those of the Indo-Germanic 
peoples and the Muslims. (BGE 20) 
While it would be premature in this inquiry to scrutinize 
extensively Nietzsche's conception of the relation of 
language to metaphysics, it should be noted that Nietzsche 
wants us to consider the self as an imagined reality which 
is propagated through language and social convention. The 
self is a common belief which loosely fitted organic 
"unities" have needed to embrace for survival. More 
specifically, the self is a manifestation of "the will to 
power" according to Nietzsche, as it makes disorganized 
quantas of power stronger by acquiring the semblance of a 
useful but fictitious unity. Thus, Nietzsche is asking us 
to think through and past the Cartesian reality of the self 
as some sort of philosophical grounding point. This method 
is relevant and useful for dealing with some of the pseudo-
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problems which exist in contemporary metaphysics. 
Various metaphysicians sometimes devise problems 
oriented around the existence of personal identity: there is 
a man, Fletcher, who was unfortunate enough to receive brain 
damage from a car accident. In dire need of a large portion 
of a brain, a brainsurgeon removes part of the brain of a 
trapeze artist, Abdul, who likes to eat onion dip, and 
transplants this portion of Abdul's brain to Fletcher's 
brain. When the surgery is completed, Fletcher is not the 
same. While he can still carry on the complex rigors of his 
job as a software engineer with his previous proficiency, he 
is also startled by his craving for onion dip which he 
previously had found intolerable to eat. He also has vivid, 
detailed memories of circus life as well as a newfound 
propensity for acrobatics and goes home to Abdul's wife and 
children, knowing things about Abdul's wife that only Abdul 
could know. 
At this point the grinning metaphysician proposes the 
following question: Is this new person Fletcher or Abdul? 
(presuming that one must be this person or the other person 
in a sense of an exclusive "or"). It becomes evident that 
one does not want to grant this "new" person the exclusive 
identity of Fletcher if he has the memories of Abdul. What 
is illuminating is that the boundaries of selfhood are here 
violated and we are left with the choices of claiming that 
the person is Fletcher with some of Abdul's memory (which 
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creates problems because personal identity is usually pre-
sumed to have a good deal to do with one having access to 
previous memories connected through time) or the person 
is a combination of Fletcher and Abdul. One could also make 
a case for the person actually being Abdul, of course, but 
this is not the point; what is important in this 
illustration is the fact that we are capable of corning up 
with problems where it is not at all certain that we can say 
a person is this person or that person. We can also make up 
reasons to justify either side, but it comes down to the 
fact that what we take for being the determinant of 
"selfhood" is bound up in a loosely determined principle. 
The belief in the ego relies on previous memory and perhaps 
a bit of guessing. If we take Nietzsche's method of denying 
the very reality of the self, this "problem" does not even 
present itself as such, simply because the "thing" which we 
call the self is not a static "thing" at all, but merely a 
regulative fiction whose exactness as a metaphysical entity 
is dictated by memory, social convention and the conditions 
of existence. When we step into weird circumstances where 
the "normal" conditions of life are otherwise, we find that 
the proof from "life" no longer holds. Philosophically, the 
task which we are given is to think through this oldest 
superstition which we have unwittingly adopted as our most 
immediate reality, the self. 
The most valuable insights are arrived at last; but 
the most valuable insights are methods (WP 469). 
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To discern a method in Nietzsche's thought is thus not 
difficult, as long as one does not think of "method" as 
being constituted by axiomatic starting points. Nietzsche 
goes so far as to assert that "a will to a system is a lack 
of integrity" (TI I 26), as the thinker who is unwilling or 
unable to relinquish hold of his own starting points already 
is biased in what he himself is maintaining. Nietzsche's 
method is simply to question everything in order to try 
to free philosophy from the tacit and outright prejudices it 
has adopted. Serious thinkers must not stop at the belief 
in the self as an ultimate grounding principle. Moreover, 
it would be better to harbor more than one soul in one's 
breast to facilitate the probing of a multiplicity of 
perspectives, as "The snake that cannot cast its skin 
perishes. So too with those minds which are prevented from 
changing their views: they cease to be minds" (D 573). 
The psychology of the belief in the ego is the most 
intimate relation that most individuals have, i.e. belief in 
one's self; but when one is determined to think "this far 
and no further ... we can surmise that he has passed the 
climax of his powers, and is very tired, very near the 
setting of his sun" (D 542). Standing in close proximity to 
belief in the self are one's thoughts on values, as the 
gauge one adopts on moral positions is an integral part of 
"self-knowledge" and leads to feelings of self-identity. 
Yet if one is going to exist with intellectual integrity, 
14 
this is precisely where one must have courage, according to 
Nietzsche, for the confrontation and overcoming of 
individual perspective, especially if that perspective bars 
various kinds of world-interpretation. 
To escape a static belief in oneself enables one to 
consider the world "from different eyes", yet the suspension 
of belief in the ego requires great strength as it entails 
undermining the closest element of ·one's existence, the com-
fort of the ground of familiarity. This is not to suggest 
the frighteningly weird insanity of alleged demonic 
possession, but merely an exercise in the suspension of 
self-enthrallment for constructive or instructive purposes. 
In this regard, Nietzsche as immoralist demonstrates a 
profound understanding of dissociative psychology: 
::::;\ 
The few who dared ... by saying "it wasn't I! Not I~ 
But a god through me". The wonderful art of creating 
gods--polytheism--was the medium through which this s\ 
impulse could discharge, purify, perfect, and enable -;\ 
itself ... In polytheism the free-spiriting and many-
. spiriting of man attained its first preliminary 
form--the strength to create for ourselves our new 
eyes--and ever again new eyes that are even more our 
own: hence man alone among all the animals~ no ~'~ et r ~ l1.1h~.h zws and perspectives (GS 143 ¼~1' I~ 0 :J \U{J..JJ ,d 'J ~§(1~ftn_J~5) f e grea power M-iich Nietzsche diagnoses in the creation of 
' "new gods" is a direct manifestation of a suspension of 
beliefs in the self, a way to place a bulwark between "the 
self" and any guilt to be wielded against that person for 
whatever deed the person needed courage from an "other" to 
~ erform. 
Through his understanding of the strength which is 
15 
wielded when one can generate an "other" to empower 
oneself, Nietzsche anticipates the interesting psychological 
defense-mechanism which has gone wrong in the majority of 
people who experience multiple personality disorders (MPD) 
In most cases, there is evidence that victims of MPD ha v e 
undergone similar previous experiences. Most persons with 
MPD have been abused emotionally and/ or physically. The 
result is that these people, in their later childhood or as 
adults harbor "extra souls" as a means to cope with harsh, 
disturbing realities of the past. While many children 
create "imaginery friends" out of boredom or recreation, 
abused children sometimes create "imaginery friends" or 
other personalities out of necessity. In this way, abuse 
can be vented towards an "other" and the ugly torment of the 
child's "reality" can be dissonated, thus creating a barrier 
between the tormented child and the abuser. Unfortunately, 
sometimes these children cannot outgrow the characters which 
they have harbored and the nasty weirdness of living with an 
abused, uncontrolled, "demonic" spirit lingers on, long 
after abuse has ceased. 
Insofar as "harboring extra souls" is concerned, 
Nietzsche realized the power of insight and action which can 
accrue to those who are strong enough for self-overcoming. 
To be stuck in one world interpretation is, according to 
Nietzsche, nothing less than a sign of weakness of a 
thinker. Ultimately one must stand outside of the want to 
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never relinquish an axiomatic starting point for the sake of 
intellectual integrity, as "serious thinkers must 
occasionally escape from their virtues" (D 510). 
What needs to be extracted here from Nietzsche's 
thought for the general theme of this paper at this time is 
that Nietzsche thinks that Descartes' cogito is doubtable 
and that the belief in the "I" is only a fiction generated 
out of the "conditions of existence": 
Many hecatombs of human beings were sacrificed 
before the impulses learned to comprehend their 
coexistence and to feel that they were all functions of 
one organizing force within one human being (GS 113) 
Thus we can surmise that although Nietzsche thinks the self 
has been very useful for biological survival, it is hardly a 
philosophically grounded starting point as Descartes would 
have us believe. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BEING AS PERSPECTIVE 
"The real and the apparent world" --I have traced this 
anti thesis back to value relations .__, We have ro · ected th 
. c 9nd i.oti -0n o_f__mu ::._ p-r::-e-s.e.:r;..v.a ti on a s - p-r::-ed i cat es of - bei _Bg in 
genera~. Because we ha ve to be stable in our be ief -g- if we 
are · to prospe -r -, - we ha -ve- ma.d .e_ th ~ r e a---i11 world a wor l d not of 
change and becoming, but one of being. --The Will to Power 
(507) ~
*** 
This chapter is to be oriented around the theme of truth 
values and moral values and the reasons why Nietzsche 
disavowed belief in them both. In chapter five, it will be 
necessary to follow up on the psychology of belief which 
Nietzsche thinks characterizes values in general. What is 
also of primary importance for this chapter and for the larger 
inquiry of this paper is Nietzsche's denial of the logician's 
"X" which is the opposite of "not-X". First of all, however, 
it is appropriate to outline the problem of moral values and 
truth values, both of which Nietzsche characterizes as 
/ . 
fictitious. 
The word "meaning" usually has two different general 
senses: 
1. "Meaning" can mean meaning in a propositional 
sense wherein it refers to discourse 
concerning a state of affairs, the way things 
are or the way things are not. 
In this sense, we would have a proposition such as "The cat 
is in the oven". If the cat is, in fact, in the oven, then 
the proposition would be meaningful in the sense that this 
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would be true, corresponding to the state of affairs. 
Likewise, if the cat is not in the oven, the proposition would 
also have meaning, though not corresponding to the state of 
affairs, as the proposition would be false. 
2. Meaning can also be used as a way to measure 
magnitude of values in the sense of morale. 
In sense #2, an instantiation of "meaning" would be: 
"My life is meaningless without you." (or) "I lack meaning 
in my job". In this second sense, we most often have 
connotations of purpose. Historically, most philosophers 
have distinguished the difference between these types of _ 
meaning in an ontological sense. This does seem reasonable, 
as the first meaning of "meaning" refers to "being as such" 
whereas the second refers to the fufillment of moral 
conditions. 
It is worth noticing that the word "true" has been used 
to designate both of the aforementioned senses of "meaning", 
designating each sense in its own "appropriate" way, yet 
still maintaining functionally different meanings: 
TRUTH: Cecil's story about the man with the wooden 
knee is not true. 
In this first case (above), we have "truth" describing the 
reality of being, i.e. what is actually the case. 
truth: Hey, hey, what can I do, 
I've got a woman and she won't be true. 
In the second usage of truth, we have truth refering to a 
correctness of or a fufillment of a moral "oughtness". It 
is interesting that the word "truth" is widely used to 
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describe both kinds of phenomena, being and 
Perhaps the word "truth" is used for both these meanings (in 
English anyway) because most users of language think of 
morals as having being irt the same way being has (or is) dJ 
being; or perhaps people are confused about what ~eing is. 
Whatever the case may be, there seems to be good reason to 
think that we can differentiate between various "things" 
which partake of being, and beliefs about "thing ~ 
·-
"Things" presumably can exist without anyone knowing about 
them or believing they exist; beliefs about morality, 
however, are presumably contingent on believers, without 
which they presumably don't exist. I am not trying to 
formulate any thesis here about the ultimate nature of moral 
values, as this is hardly necessary for the current theme of 
inquiry. Rather, what is of importance here is the 
recognition that most philosophers establish and maintain a 
difference between morality and being as such, and there 
exist many methods which are used to distinguish between 
these two types of "meaning" (and) "truth". A fairly 
innocent example might be furnished for the difference 
between "truth in the sense of morals" and "truth in the 
sense of being" by claiming "the ground is morally neutral 
but the ground is not neutral in a sense of being because it 
"is"--it partakes of being". Nietzsche, as we will see, 
however, denies not only the reality of the moral realm but 
also rejects the reality of the more fundamental, primary 
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source of truth, that which is grounded in being, dismissing 
the "reality" of being as an "all too human" construction. 
In his early essay, On Truth and Falsity, Nietzsche 
claims "If he [man] does not mean to content himself with 
truth in the shape of tautology, that is, with empty husks, 
he will always obtain illusions instead of truth" (TF p. 
177). What Nietzsche is asserting here is that all truths 
are bound to be unilluminating because they are circular or 
tautological; the reason this is so is because these truths 
only exist as a byproduct of the relationships which man 
himself determines. Since man is the cause of stable meta-
physical entities through his process of "falsification" of 
reality, he is trapped in a game of self-referential 
groundlessness for his uncovering of "truths" ~ 
At the heart of the presumption of truth is the 
underlying implicit metaphysics of language and logic which 
distinguishes "x" from "non-x" in a way which falsely 
presumes that its method is non-problematic: 
Every word becomes at once an idea by ... having 
simultaneously to fit innumerable, more or less similar 
(which means never equal, therefore altogether unequal) 
cases. Every idea originates through equating the 
unequal. As certainly as no one leaf is exactly similar 
to any other, so certain is it that the idea "leaf" has 
been formed through an arbitrary omission of these 
individual differences, through a forgetting of the 
differentiating qualities, and this idea now awakens the 
notion that in nature there is, besides the leaves, a 
something called "the leaf", perhaps according to which 
... no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a 
true copy of the primal form. (TF p. 179) 
Here begins the falsification of phenomena at the most 
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fundamental level, at the existence not only of "words", but 
through their supporting metaphysical entities. There exist 
no essential qualities for these alleged "things" which are, 
through language, arbitrarily categorized. They are by-
products of "all too human" perspective optics, as they are 
"truths" grounded only in convention . Nietzsche thinks that 
the supposition that there is some underlying infallible 
logic behind words is a naive assumption, as the existence 
of universals is due only to a "forgetting of the dif-
ferentiating qualities". 
The underlying logic of language which presumes there 
is a justified way to distinguish "x" from "not-x", i.e. to 
differentiate "something" from what "something is not" in a 
logical fashion is a fiction: "The logical truth of a pair 
of opposites being and non-being is completely empty, if the 
object of which it is a reflection cannot be given. Without 
such derivation from a perception, it is no more than a 
playing with ideas, which in fact yields no knowledge ... the 
error as to content rather than form cannot be detected by 
using any logical touchstone whatsoever" (PTG XI). 
Nietzsche's appraisal of the arbitrary guidelines which 
determine metaphysical entities makes sense in that it is 
impossible to have a "logical" way, i.e choice-free way to 
postulate the existence of metaphysical entities. One must 
first ask the question: what is going to "count" as a deter-
minant for this various thing to be an "x" or a "non-x". In 
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the answer to this question we must, out of necessity, be 
involved in a choice-grounded structuring of the entity 
itself--the criterion for "what is going to count", and this 
choice could be otherwise. There needs to be a presup-
position that the initial criterion is correct. Thus being, 
as grounded by metaphysical entities, is supposed into 
existence. Once "being" has been supposed into existence, 
treated a priori, the "truth game" can be played, but this 
is hardly noteworthy if one has the expectation that this 
"truth" has a capacity to illuminate us about some extra-
linguistic reality: 
If somebody hides a thing behind a bush, seeks it 
again and finds it in the self-same place, then there is 
not much to boast of, respecting this seeking and 
finding; thus, however, matters stand with the seeking 
and finding of "truth" within the realm of reason. If I 
make the definition of the mammal and then declare after 
inspecting the camel, "Behold a mammal", then no doubt a 
truth is brought to light thereby, but it is of very 
limited value, I mean it is anthropomorphic through and 
through, and does not contain one single point which is 
"true-in-itself", real and valid, apart from man. 
(TF p. 183) 
The whole notion of truth "being out there" indepen-
dently of human meddling is dismissed by Nietzsche as a 
starry-eyed fiction. The pre-existent "real world" which is 
assumed to exist in a capacity to afford us transcendent 
truths does not exist, as "we are spiders capable of 
catching only what fits in our webs" (D 117). What we are 
left with is a Heraclitean flux of undifferentiated 
oneness. Nietzsche leaves us staring down the barrel of a 
loaded infinite series of "particulars" with no logical 
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grouping categories apart from those which we contrive in 
the most basic sense. The oneness is just that, as when we 
speak of this Heraclitean ultimate, it no longer makes sense 
to speak of logical dualism ( "x" vs. "non-x") except as a 
confusion about the origin and role of conceptualization. 
Here also falls "being" in the sense of being as the 
opposite of "non-being", for there is no "non-being" apart 
from that which we project onto the "one". Non-being is 
only a derivation out of the belief in the reality of 
metaphysical categories. 
Nietzsche claims that the world seems "logical" only 
because humans have unwittingly made it logical, positing 
substance and categories a priori. Yet Nietzsche warns 
logicians that logic rests on assumptions that do not cor-
respond to anything in the undifferentiated oneness of 
reality. A product of falsification is "the assumption of 
the equality of things, the identity of the same thing at 
different points in time ... fortunately it is too late to be 
able to revoke the development of reason, which rests on 
that belief" (HA 11). It is important to realize here that 
Nietzsche diagnosed truth as "a kind of error without which 
a certain species could not live", considering truth as a 
practically if not epistemologically gounded relation. Yet 
this certainly goes beyond human falsification, as other 
species must posit the existence of things persisting 
through time. Katie the dog may not articulate it as such, 
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but she utilizes her "dog logic" when chasing cats, assuming 
that when the cat hides under the car, the cat still remains 
a cat--and perhaps a tasty one at that. This assumption of 
object permanence and persistence through time is something 
which living things must adopt to survive and is thus a 
fundamental condition of life. Even "dog logic" must dis-
tinguish the difference between various types of "things", 
in order to get food, avoid danger, etc. Herein lies the 
elemental necessary prejudice of stable entities which 
virtually all species adopt, a logic for survival in the 
most basic sense. Katie the dog doesn't need to be 
concerned with the ultimate metaphysical grounding of the 
cat, but philosophers should, according to Nietzsche, take 
cognizance of the presuppositions which ground their notions 
of metaphysical entities, and independent self-sufficient 
duration through time is one of them. Likewise, the belief 
in universals and (more importantly) the belief in "things" 
are only beliefs which are outgrowths of a particular 
perspective; this perspective that there are "things" is a 
prejudice adopted out of the belief in matter. Yet this 
theme of the groundedness of materiality is related to 
Nietzsche's critique of Kant and this issue needs to be 
discussed in the next chapter, The Illusion of Things. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ILLUSION OF THINGS 
Perhaps we will recognize that the thing-in-itself 
deserves a homeric laugh, in that it seemed so much, indeed 
everything, and is actually empty, that is, empty of 
meaning.--Human, All too Human (16) 
*** 
In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
writes of "music being the immediate language of the will", 
with language doomed forever to hold only a superficial 
contact with music: 
... set over against music, all appearance becomes a 
mere analogy, so it happens that language, the organ of 
symbol and appearance, can never succeed in bringing the 
innermost core of music to the surface ... no amount of 
poetic eloquence will carry us a step closer to the 
essential secret of that art. (BT VI) 
While Nietzsche is certainly right in his diagnosis 
that language can never capture what music "is" by 
communicating how it sounds through narrative, it is more 
important to note that Nietzsche attributes a sort of primal 
stomping ground of truth to the realm of Dionysian art in 
his first book. This is before the turn in his thought 
which would eventually culminate in the outright rejection 
of Kant's "thing in itself" as unreal, denouncing it as a 
mere result of confused thinking. Nietzsche's later period 
would also attack Kant's whole project of trying to come to 
grips with "pure reason", an undertaking which is, out of 
the necessity which characterizes all attempts to frame a 
theory of knowledge, mistaken in its inception. 
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Before embarking on the investigation of circularity 
which Nietzsche discloses as embedded in any theory of 
knowledge or truth, it is important to realize that the 
problem of self-reference is one Nietzsche himself was very 
much concerned with. This will be a concern in chapter 
four, as it will be necessary to test Nietzsche's own 
epistemic footing, whether he wants to admit he has feet or, 
he in fact, exists. Whether Nietzsche stands outside of 
metaphysics is a question which must be dealt with. At this 
time, however it may be helpful to introduce a distinction 
which will also prove to be of use later in this inquiry. 
In John Lange's book The Cognitivity Paradox, Lange 
distinguishes between first and second order philosophy: 
First order philosophy is philosophy as proposal. 
Second order philosophy is philosophy which pre-
supposes that the first order questions are settled and 
proceeds on that basis (Lange p. 59) 
This distinction between first and second order 
philosophy will help in making sense of two interesting 
problems which need to be dealt with here. The first is 
Nietzsche's criticism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
The second is the circularity that exists in all attempts to 
propose a theory of knowledge. The second problem 
exists because any theory of truth or knowledge which is 
proposed is bound up in its inception with at least two 
"valuations" which could be otherwise; there needs to be a 
"value" that considers "truth" as something worthy of 
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investigation in order for a framing of truth to begin and 
there also needs to be the value-choice of what is to be the 
determinant of "truth". In this chapter, the latter problem 
of having to choose the discriminating determinant of truth 
will be a central theme. Analysis of the other "value" will 
be postponed until chapter five, as this "value" has to do 
with the utility of truth. 
The distinction which Lange makes regarding first and 
second order philosophy helps in articulating Nietzsche's 
rejection of Kant. Nietzsche, as Hegel did before him, 
realized that setting limits on reason presupposes a stance 
outside of reason and this is, according to reason itself, 
quite unreasonable. The mistake which Kant makes is that he 
isolates himself in the second order philosophy and for that 
reason the starting point of his inquiry harbors 
unrecognized presuppositions which ought not be accepted. 
Kant not only presupposes that knowledge is possible, but he 
wants an analysis of that which he himself has supposed into 
existence: 
One would have to know what being is in order to 
decide whether this or that is real ... what certainty is, 
what knowledge is and the like--But since we do not know 
this, a critique of the faculty of knowledge is sense-
less: how could a tool be able to criticize itself 
when it can only use itself for the critique? It cannot 
even define itself! (WP 486) 
Kant practices "second order philosophy", assuming that the 
problems of knowledge and certainty have already been 
settled. In undertaking The Critique of Pure Reason, he 
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does not start by asking the question if there is knowledge, 
but rather asks under what conditions is knowledge 
possible; "If I do not already know whether there is 
knowledge, whether there can be knowledge, I cannot 
reasonably put the question 'what is knowledge?' Kant 
believes in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a piece 
of naivete: knowledge of knowledge!" (WP 530) 
Kant's project needs to assume the availability of a 
transcendent mode of cognition, in order for the critique 
not to be used on itself; he must be certain of what 
"certainty is" aforehand, but there is no guarantee of the 
veracity of his initial supposition of what constitutes 
certainty. In order for the critique even to begin, the 
inquirer must suspend the conditions under which knowledge 
is possible so it is free from self-examination. Nietzsche 
attacks Kant precisely because Kant has delegated himself an 
epistemologically privileged status which is impossible to 
exist without a fundamental breach of reason. Moreover, 
this problem which Nietzsche scrutinizes about the 
circularity that exists in any attempt to frame or construct 
a theory of knowledge facilitates similar insights into the 
elemental workings of inquiry, i.e. the fundamental problem 
of the circularity of truth. 
Nietzsche realizes that all conceptions of truth and 
knowledge are inextricably bound up in value judgements; he 
also asserts that the truth theories of philosophers have 
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been characterized by an underhanded ignoring or forgetting 
of this: 
They (philosophers) all pose as if they had 
discovered and reached their real opinions through 
the self - development of a cold, pure, divinely un-
concerned dialectic (as opposed to the mystics of every 
rank, who are more honest and doltish--and talk of 
"inspiration")--while at bottom it is an assumption, a 
hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration"--most often a 
desire of the heart that has been filtered and made 
abstract--that they defend with reasons they have sought 
after the fact. (BGE 5) 
Nietzsche makes evident that he believes that any theory of 
truth which is advanced is inevitably bound up in this 
"inspiration". For this reason, in any theory of knowledge, 
the problem of the nonexistence of any value-free criteria 
manifests itself; whatever one chooses to be the determinant 
of truth presupposes the correctness of that very initial 
criterion. Thus, it makes no sense even to speak of non-
perspectival truth because any thinkable truth criterion is 
inevitably prejudiced by an initial confession or 
"inspiration" as to what is going "to make" or bear truth. 
The impossiblity of legitimate truth theories prompts 
Nietzsche to warn: 
"Pure reason", "absolute intelligence", presuppose 
an eye such as no living being can imagine, an eye 
required to have no direction, to abrogate its active 
and interpretative powers--precisely those powers that 
alone make seeing, seeing something. All seeing is 
essentially perspective, and so is all knowing. 
(GM III 7) 
Many philosophers have (and still do) describe the highest 
powers of cognition as a sort of "mental seeing", as the 
organ of sight seems to be the most disconcealing and lucid 
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of any of the powers of sense perception. Lacking any other 
analogy which could capture the highest powers of 
"intuition" in such an immediacy, this seems quite 
sensible. Yet the question remains: how justified is 
Nietzsche in making his claim that knowing is like seeing, 
grounded in perspective? How far can Nietzsche take this 
analogy? Moreover, what proof has Nietzsche to ground such 
an assertion and how are we to understand such a claim in 
the context of his other thought? 
Insofar as perception and intellection are relational 
between a subject and some object, Nietzsche's metaphor is 
illustrative; in both cases one needs to distinguish a 
criterion of reality. 
A. (with knowledge) How do I know this? What is 
the reason why I think I know this? Have I 
taken the reality of this assertion on 
testimony? What are the presuppositions that 
need to exist for me to know that this "x" is a 
"fact"? 
B. (with seeing) How do I see this? What is the 
reason "why" I think I see this real, existent 
thing? Is this merely a bad hallucination? Is 
this a hologram? A mirage? 
In cases of knowledge, it is obvious that Nietzsche is 
driving at the point that we do not have a value-free schema 
for leveling claims about knowledge. One provides reasons 
for one's justifications based on presumably more certain, 
fundamental truths and Nietzsche provides good evidence that 
such truths simply don't exist. As we have already seen, 
Nietzsche believes that we must confront questions about 
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knowledge through our own "colored" schemas. In the context 
of Nietzsche's thought, it is evident that he has not only 
denied the reality of knowledge because of its relational 
character, but he has also denied the reality of the 
categories by which we distinguish between various objects 
of sense perception, as both are byproducts of a particular 
perspective which could be otherwise in "other conditions of 
life". Not only are we in the midst of "falsified" perspec-
tives, both perceptually and cognitively, but Nietzsche 
thinks we should abort belief in both the permanence of 
physical as well as metaphysical pre-existent realities, 
likening "pure materiality" to the unreality of the 
logician's self-sufficient "a": 
The "A" of logic is like the atom, a reconstruction 
of the thing--If we do not grasp this, but make of logic 
a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing 
as realities all those hypostases: substance, 
attribute, object, action, subject, action, etc.; that 
is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is a "real 
world" (--this, however, is the apparent world once 
more--) (WP 516). 
Under the influence of Dalmatian Boscovitch, who regarded 
atoms "themselves as immaterial centres of force" (Dampier, 
p. 297), Nietzsche is ready to dispense with "the changeling 
of the atom". Both philosophers view the atom as assailable 
unities which could be broken down further and further, 
therefore suggesting that there are no elementary "units", 
or static building blocks of matter. Insofar as science 
currently understands the atom as a sort of cloud of energy 
with particles of charge existing in only statistically 
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probable locations, "the atom cannot meaningfully be said to 
posess any of those qualities which we attribute to 
experience--not red, sweet, [or] smooth" (Grimm p. 74-5) 
The very reality of the material world is thus only a 
manifestation of our schema through which we view it. It 
does not "really exist" in a way outside of the inter-
pretative slant we bring to it by our very acts of 
perception. Thus, understanding Nietzsche's analogy between 
knowing and seeing is laden with more than just a rejection 
of the reality of knowledge. As evidenced in Beyond Good 
and Evil as well as The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche is 
undertaking the mischievous task of denying the reality of 
the material world. Moreover, modern science via quantum 
mechanics has come around to Boscovich and Nietzsche's way 
of thinking, as the groundedness of "things" in materiality 
is only insecure at best. 
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has 
eyes--and consequently there are many "truths", and 
consequently there is no truth. (WP 540) 
With Nietzsche's rejection of the subject and the material 
world as nonexistent, independent realities, he is left in 
the peculiar position of dismissing all phenomena as 
"fictions". Insofar as Nietzsche has taken up the problem 
of being in contact with the phenomenal realm in an 
exclusive sense, Nietzsche can be thought of as a sort of 
"nee-Kantian". However, Nietzsche's stance is radically 
different, as he denies the intelligibility of the noumena. 
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Nietzsche's appraisal of philosophy and humanity is one 
which is sunk deeply in self-deception as man is capable of 
seeing nothing but shadows on the wall of Plato's cave, 
unreal images mistaken for "realities". To speak of an 
"outside" of the cave where there could be immutable, 
enduring, nonhuman truths is to speak of an altogether 
undemonstrable and therefore fictitious world. The problem 
of there being no unbiased measures of reality creates the 
problem of an epistemic dissonance between the reality of 
concepts and what the things are which they reflect, for 
strictly speaking, according to Nietzsche, the "things 
themselves" don't exist. With the abandonment of the 
existence of "things", we also have the vanishing of the 
possibility of "facts" as existent: 
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena--"There 
are only facts"--I would say: No, facts are precisely 
what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot 
establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to 
want to do such a thing (WP 481). 
With Nietzsche's appraisal of the non-existence of facts, 
many problems are raised insofar as problems of language are 
concerned; i.e. does Nietzsche want us to take his appraisal 
as a "fact", a statement about reality? Or is there no 
reality? Moreover, if there is no reality, how does one 
defend such a position--through "real" concepts? Now that 
we have a general outline of Nietzsche's approach to 
epistemology, these are the tasks which are to be 
investigated in the next chapter, along with other 
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metaphysical problems which have been raised by Nietzsche's 
assault on truth. The most elemental theme which needs to be 
investigated, however, is the problem of self-reference that 
Nietzsche diagnoses and whether he himself is immersed in 
it. 
When we endeavor to examine the mirror itself, we 
discover in the end that we can detect nothing there but 
the things which it reflects. If we wish to grasp the 
things reflected we touch nothing in the end but the 
mirror - -this is the general history of knowledge. 
(D 243). 
35 
CHAPTER FOUR: ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF LANGUAGE AND BEING 
The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., 
it is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the basis 
of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux", as 
something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always 
changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no 
"truth".--The Will to Power (616) 
*** 
Now that we have a general outline of Nietzsche's 
methodology and his stance on epistemology, it is necessary 
to direct some critical thought towards the problems which 
Nietzsche has generated through his stances on knowledge and 
truth. The following chapter will investigate some of the 
problems one encounters when one denies the existence of 
stable metaphysical entities; without such entities existing 
apart from the delusion of human contrivance, truth becomes 
fiction . The outright denial of the groundedness of truth 
presents some problems with the defensibility of such a 
position and also reveals some problems with the limits and 
meaning of language. Chapter four will also begin the in-
vestigation of Nietzsche's conception of the "lie", which he 
uses as a word (and perhaps as an action) in an "untra-
ditional sense". 
As outlined in chapter two, the word "truth" has been 
used to describe both epistemological and moral "truths". 
Insofar as this chapter is concerned, it will be important 
to examine the epistemological sense of truth and the 
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position which Nietzsche takes on it. It should be noted 
that Nietzsche's appraisal of what is "going on" in 
philosophy has stirred up trouble for himself in his 
reception by various philosophers. Even in his day, The 
Birth of Tragedy "provoked pamphlets and counter-pamphlets 
attacking him on grounds of common sense and sanity. For a 
time Nietzsche, then professor of classical philology at the 
University of Basle, had no students in his field . His 
lectures were sabatoged by German philosophy professors who 
advised their students not to show up for Nietzsche's 
courses" (PTG translator's Introduction I). 
There has been a good deal of confusion in the 
interpretation of Nietzsche's thought, some of which is due 
to the nature of the project Nietzsche was involved with, 
denying what was previously considered to be the given 
standard by which reality is to be measured, i.e . truth, as 
"fiction". Frederick Copleston, in his book Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Philosopher of Culture, claimed Nietzsche was 
"motivated by a firm _resolve to shut his eyes to the truth", 
and several other philosophers have all but dismissed 
Nietzsche as having something seriously wrong with his 
philosophy. In Nietzsche we have a person who claims on the 
one hand that "there is no truth" and then we find him 
asserting: 
I wish ... that these microscopic examiners of the 
soul may be really courageous, magnanimous, and proud 
animals, who know how to contain their emotions and have 
trained themselves to subordinate all wishful thinking 
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to the truth--any truth, even a homespun, severe, ugly, 
obnoxious, un-Christian, unmoral truth. For such truths 
do exist. (GM I 11) 
Nietzsche seems to be taking both sides of mutually 
exclusive positions, claiming that there is no truth and 
then claiming there are truths. However, if one looks at 
the larger problem of what Nietzsche is "trying to get at", 
and the medium through which he is trying to communicate it, 
we can rescue Nietzsche from at least some of the problems 
of contradiction he is involved with. 
It is important to realize that Nietzsche uses the word 
"truth" as oriented around the existence of "being as such" 
in two different ways. Failure to distinguish between them 
will undoubtedly produce "contradictions" and provide 
warrant to anyone who wants to dismiss him as philo-
sophically "clowning around". The distinction which needs 
to be made here is between: Tl. Truth as grounded in 
"value-free" being, which Nietzsche claims does not exist 
(and) T2. Truth as part of the "game" of anthropomorphic 
logicolinguistic rules. In the case of truth as grounded in 
"value-free" being, we have Nietzsche claiming that "truth 
does not exist", i.e. as some extra-linguistic reality, as 
there are no meaningful entities that exist prior to human 
"falsification" of such stabilities into existence. The 
second use of "truth" which Nietzsche embraces is truth as 
part of the "game-playing" of linguistic reality. Through 
this medium, Nietzsche as a writer must channel his thoughts 
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insofar as he wants to communicate "rational" ideas. One 
must take cognizance of this mode through which humans 
understand ideas, as truth in this sense Nietzsche has no 
desire to deny. It exists, but it is not pre-existently 
"real", as is often tacitly supposed by its users. 
There has been a good deal of misunderstanding of the 
development of Nietzsche's thought based on the confusion of 
Tl and T2. This is still going on, most recently by 
Maudemarie Clark in her book Nietzsche on Truth and Philo-
sophy. Clark claims that there is a radical swing in 
Nietzsche's appraisal of science in his later books, citing 
Nietzsche's early claims that science "falsifies" reality 
and then providing evidence from The Genealogy of Morals and 
The Antichrist that Nietzsche no longer thought that 
knowledge and science "falsify" in his later works. The 
problem which Clark fails to grasp is that Nietzsche is 
concerned with two different senses of "truth" in these 
works and the shift in attitude does not mark a change in 
his rejection of epistemological reality; the early views of 
truth as illusions from On Truth and Falsity are throroughly 
consistent with his later celebration of science. 
The shift that Clark proposes as existent in 
Nietzsche's thought is not a shift in position as Clark 
believes. Rather, it is a shift in the the type of "truth" 
which Nietzsche is scrutinizing. In Nietzsche's early 
denial of truth, he does so because he is trying to make 
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evident that the process of falsification is necessary 
because humans must posit imaginary "things" and categories 
by which to reason about those things, i.e. universals. 
Later, in The Antichrist when Nietzsche lauds science as 
"the wisdom of the world", he is writing of truth in a 
specific and different sense. The "wisdom of the world" 
which he praises is consistent with his earlier thought, as 
here Nietzsche is consciously speaking within the 
anthropomorphic realm of truth which he had himself 
outlined. Merely because all things are ultimately 
metaphysically "false" does not mean one can not play the 
"game of truth" which exists in the anthropomorphic realm in 
different ways; one can obviously reason in cleaner, more 
proficient ways or poorer ways in this realm. Just because 
one does not have a stable basis for the grounding of the 
logico-linguistic entities such as "things" and universals 
by which one groups "things", does not mean that there are 
not better ways to understand and utilize the consequential 
causal relations which "flow" from these entities once we 
have adopted them. There is logic which governs fiction and 
Nietzsche's denunciation of pseudosience in Twilight of the 
Idols makes this thrust quite clear: 
Today we possess science precisely to the extent to 
which we have decided to accept the testimony of the 
senses--to the extent to which we have learned to 
sharpen them further, arm them, and then learned to 
think them through. The rest is miscarriage and 
not-yet-science--or formal science, a doctrine of 
science, a doctrine of signs, such as logic and that 
applied logic which is called mathematics. In them 
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reality is not encountered at all, not even as a 
problem--no more than the question of the value of such 
a sign-convention as logic. (TI III 3) 
Nietzsche's position that in science "reality is not encoun-
tered at all, not even as a problem" provides good reason to 
think he still retained his falsification thesis through his 
later works, although Clark takes the contrary position. 
However, Clark is right in diagnosing a shift in Nietzsche's 
thought about the role of the senses. Nietzsche had 
claimed earlier in Human, All Too Human that we are wrapped 
in the falsifying sensations of the senses which have been 
left over from "the period of low organisms: 
Someday the gradual origin of this tendency in lower 
organisms will be shown, how the mole's eyes of these 
organizations [unities] at first see everything as 
identical; (HA 18) 
Nietzsche clearly did change from this early thinking in 
that in his later position he believed the senses do not 
falsify, insofar as they show passing away and change; what 
we make of them through logic, positing unities which 
correspond to sense perception in the form of the self-
sameness of "things" "falsifies". Nietzsche is thus not 
giving up on his notion that humans themselves still do 
"falsify". The reason Clark thinks that Nietzsche believed 
he should abandon his falsification thesis and did actually 
do so in his later works is due to her failure to 
distinguish the difference between Nietzsche's use of two 
different senses of truth, Tl (truth as existent in some 
extralinguistic sense which is "out there" and pre-made in 
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the world), and T2, (truth as an anthropomorphic linguis tic 
"game") . 
Clark claims that Nietzsche's shift away from the 
falsification thesis was necessitated by Nietzsche's later 
dismissal of Kant's "thing-in-itself" as a contradictory 
notion. Nietzsche's diagnosis of the existence of "things" 
as being able to exist only in relation to other unproven 
"things", i . e. positing agents, certainly does confirm that 
Nietzsche thinks in his later stage that the "thing-
in-itself" is contradictory, or at best a product of 
confused thinking. To ask how an object looks from no 
perspective or how an object "is" from no perspective is 
dismissed by Nietzsche as meaningless (see chapter three). 
While Clark is certainly right in her recognition that 
Nietzsche did not dismiss the "thing-in-itself" as an 
impossibility in The Birth of Tragedy and in On Truth and 
Falsity, Clark's appraisal of Nietzsche's alleged 
realization that there is a necessary mutual exclusivity 
between the falsification thesis and the existence of 
"things-in-themselves" is based on Clark's own 
misunderstanding of Nietzsche's attack on the reality of 
"truth" in a pre-linguistic sense (Tl). 
Clark believes falsification cannot happen if there are 
no "things-in-themselves" that can be falsified. Through 
this supposition, Clark interprets a good deal of 
Nietzsche's thought, erroneously supposing that Nietzsche 
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himself recognized this and changed his thoughts on science, 
among other things. Yet it is evident by the type of truth 
Nietzsche denies, that Clark is applying a truth paradigm 
that ought not be used. This is precisely the type of truth 
Nietzsche is trying do deny, but is forced to do so through 
an inauthentic medium, language. 
The 11 truth 11 which Nietzsche is trying to deny is one in 
which there are 11 real existent things". If the world is 
simply an undifferentiated Heraclitean oneness, where 
"things" and logical categories are contrived in the most 
fundamental sense, we have the problem of trying to com-
municate this through language, which must presuppose we do 
have language connected to being in an unproblematic way. 
Nietzsche is trying to escape metaphysics but is imprisoned 
in the language which he must use which cannot permit him to 
claim that something falsifies if there is no truth of which 
the something is falsifying. For this reason, the word 
11being 11 in this Heraclitean-Nietzschean voice means 
something radically different than 11being 11 otherwise would, 
for it is not the opposite of non-being, but an 
undifferentiated oneness where the parameters of language 
are not able to spill out. If there exist no opposites in 
such a realm by which we consider "what is 11 in contra-
distinction to "what is not", we are left with a world 
withdrawn into a quietude prior to logical dualism and truth 
can only make the sound of one hand clapping, for "one is 
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always wrong, but with two, truth begins" (GS 260). In 
this area the metaphysics of language breaks down, as we 
cannot expect Nietzsche to elaborate successfully the 
unconceptual through the conceptual framework of language. 
With no logical relation between the "things" which we posit 
and the stuff which we take for representing these "things", 
we have no basis for granting these entities the grounding 
force of truth, as they simply hide behind the perpectival 
cloak of the fiction of "being". One can, therefore, have a 
process of falsification without the existence of 
"things-in-themselves", but we must understand "falsity" in 
a different sense; the word "falsity" must be understood 
here as linguistically and logically different, for there is 
no "truth" which it can be measured up against: 
If the existence of things themselves cannot be 
proved, surely the inter-relationship of things, their 
so called being or nonbeing, will advance us not a step 
toward the land of truth. Through words and concepts we 
shall never reach beyond the wall of relations, to some 
sort of fabulous primal ground of things" (PTG XI). 
The barrier which Nietzsche wants to step through 
cannot be done through linguistic truth, simply because we 
have no way to critique the language that describes what is 
presumed to be most real (truth, being) from an outside 
vantagepoint. When Nietzsche says that man's truths are 
"merely his irrefutable errors", what he is driving at is 
nothing less than the denial of the stable entities which 
are necessary for non-contrived truth to exist . 
.. . what naivete to extract from (schematization) a 
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proof that we are therewith in posession of a "truth in 
itself"!--Not being able to contradict is proof of an 
incapacity, not of "truth" (WP 515) 
To speak of "truth" and "being" in this above sense 
extends language to a realm which language normally does not 
have access to. One must not confuse this kind of 
existence--undifferentiated oneness with the linguistic 
realm of logical dualism. Problems that exist with 
interpreting Nietzsche on truth often manifest themselves 
because Nietzsche is in the peculiar position of needing a 
lexicon which distinguishes between truth "as grounded in 
stable metaphysical entities" (Tl) from truth as existent 
within the linguistic game (T2). This situation demands that 
Nietzsche's readers look carefully for "signposts" to 
discern the channels through which his thought goes. Yet we 
also find problems which are not as easily explained away in 
Nietzsche's thought. The problem still exists of discerning 
where Nietzsche's insights ground his own claims within the 
"truth game" which he himself outlines as dissonant from 
reality. 
If we take Nietzsche's thoughts on epistemology seri-
ously, we can surmise that Nietzsche apparently thinks that 
he has refused to take an epistemological stance (within 
epistemology) based on his methodology. If Nietzsche is 
correct in his claims about linguistic, anthropomorphic 
truth, it seems that all claims would be ultimately 
metaphysically false. In spite of this, Nietzsche thinks 
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that there are better and worse ways of operating 
cognitively once the belief in stable metaphysical entities 
is adopted. This does not appear to be problematic; i.e. 
once one adopts tacit belief in "things" one can understand 
the various causal relations which would thereby flow from 
them to reason in better or worse ways. Yet there is a big 
problem insofar as Nietzsche has dealt himself the ability 
to declare that "things" don't exist and there can be no 
epistemological truth. Nietzsche must reason according to 
logical principles to illustrate his claim that epistemology 
is bound to be circular. Any path by which Nietzsche 
establishes that truth criteria must be circular, 
presupposes that he must use those very "circular" rules to 
establish such a claim. Thus Nietzsche's position 
undermines a great deal, including itself. However, this 
may not even have interested Nietzsche, as it is not clear 
that Nietzsche even supposes that he is not writing 
"fiction". 
At this point, we must challenge what Nietzsche means 
by "lie", as he seems to understand the lie in both his 
"ultimate metaphysical sense of truth" and within the 
linguistic "game" of truth. It is not clear, however, that 
he obeys the rules of the latter kind of truth, even when he 
makes no pretensions of speaking in the former. That is, in 
Nietzsche's earlier period, he misuses the word "lie" in a 
linguistic sense. This is perhaps a bit ironic as he also 
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provides us with some reason to believe that the young 
Nietzsche himself lies. 
In On Truth and Falsity, Nietzsche writes: 
we really and truly do not know anything at all 
about an essential quality which might be called 
honesty, but we know about individualized, and 
therefore unequal actions, which we equate by omission 
of the unequal, and now designate as dishonest actions; 
finally out of them we formulate a qualitas occulta with 
the name "honesty". (TF p. 180) 
Out of this line of thinking, Nietzsche dismisses the 
pre-existent ontological reality of the lie, claiming the 
liar only "abuses the fixed conventions by convenient 
substitution or even inversion of terms" (TF p. 176). There 
is nothing logically suspect about Nietzsche's dismissal of 
the metaphysical groundedness of the "lie"; yet Nietzsche 
incorrectly uses the word "lie" in the conventional linguis-
tic sense while not voicing any intention of speaking in the 
sense of Tl which undermines the reality of all linguistic 
units: 
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of meta-
phors, metonyrnies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of 
human relations which became poetically and rhetorically 
intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long 
usage seem to a nation fixed, canonic, and binding; 
truths are illusions of which one has forgotten they are 
illusions ... to be truthful, that is to use the usual 
metaphors, therefore expressed morally: we have heard 
only about the obligation to lie according to a fixed 
convention, to lie gregariously in a style binding for 
all. Now man of course forgets that matters are going 
thus with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed 
out unconsciously and according to habits of centuries' 
standing--and by that very unconsciousness, by the very 
forgetting, he arrives at a sense of truth (TF p. 
180-1). 
Here Nietzsche obviously equates "falsehood" with lying, as 
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Nietzsche seems to speak of "lie" in the sense of a general 
false consciousness, a world view which perpetuates itself 
through convention. Only through such perpetuation does 
humanity stumble onto its "truth". Thus Nietzsche provides 
his account of truth in an Aussermoralischen Sinne. 
Nietzsche also reinterprets the conventional meaning of 
forgetting, as it seems that one must know one possesses 
metaphors if one is going to "forget" that one has only 
metaphors. This is clearly not the case in the above 
passage. Nietzsche chooses not to stay within the 
traditionally inscribed meanings of individual words. 
Moreover, Nietzsche's work refuses to fit into other 
traditional lingusitic paradigms for discourse, as is 
evident by his use of the aphorism. Nietzsche's undermining 
of the pre-existent metaphysical reality of the lie enables 
him to extend the meaning of "lie" and other words to realms 
of meaning he would otherwise not have access to. 
Consequentially, this makes a single, correct interpretation 
of Nietzsche's philosophy very difficult, as is evidenced by 
the very different readings of Nietzsche by scholars. One 
could even make a case for claiming that "the way does not 
exist" in interpreting Nietzsche's thinking. Yet this 
problem with language should be temporarily forestalled, as 
this problem will resurface in chapter five. We should 
rather return to where the lie lies in Nietzsche's notion of 
truth. 
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In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche's self-styled 
prophet is approached by one of his disciples who asks 
Zarathustra about the poets: 
But what was it that Zarathustra once said to you? 
That the poets lie too much? But Zarathustra too is a 
poet ... But suppose somebody said in all seriousness, the 
poets lie too much: he would be right, we do lie too 
much. We also know too little and we are bad learners; 
so we simply have to lie. And who among us poets has 
not adulterated his wine? Many a poisonous hodgepodge 
has been contrived in our cellars; much that is 
indescribable was accomplished there. And because we 
know so little, the poor in spirit please us heartily, 
particularly when they are young females (Z II 17) 
Considering the role of Zarathustra in Nietzsche's thought 
as one who embodies Nietzsche's insights, it might be wise 
to exercise caution while examining the content of 
Nietzsche's phiolosophy. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
claims that the death of Greek tragedy was at the hands of 
"aesthetic socratism": 
The fact that the aims of Socrates and Euripides 
were closely allied did not escape the attention of 
their contemporaries. We have an eloquent illustration 
of the rumor, current at the time in Athens, that 
Socrates was helping Euripides with his writing. (BT 
XIII) 
Nietzsche's access to this "rumor" as well as the role that 
he ascribes to Greek tragedy as functioning as a religious 
catharthis in Greek culture is perhaps dubious. When he 
presented this book while holding his chair in philology at 
Basel, his colleagues were incensed: Where are citations? 
Is this person fabricating things about Socrates and Greek 
tragedy? 
Nietzsche characterized untruth as a condition of 
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life. Insofar as trusting Nietzsche on matters of fact, it 
would probably be wise to exercise a good deal of caution. 
Fortunately for this inquiry, the central concerns have been 
about epistemological truth. Nietzsche's thoughts on 
"truth" stand independently of any lies which he could have 
fabricated. I am not suggesting that Nietzsche is a 
pathological liar, but one should notice that Nietzsche did 
at times claim a preference for "falsity"--or as Nietzsche 
might have put it, a preference for "art", as "art is worth 
more than truth" (WP 853). This places us at the parting 
point for chapter four , as the theme of truth as a 
moral/morale value must be taken up in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONFUSING THE LEAST REAL WITH THE MOST REAL 
It might seem as though I had evaded the question of 
"certainty." The opposite is true; but by inquiring after 
the criterion of certainty I tested the scales upon which 
men have weighed in general hitherto--and that the question 
of certainty itself is a question of the second rank ... 
The question of values is more fundamental than the question 
of certainty: the latter becomes serious only by 
presupposing that the value question has already been 
answered.--The Will to Power (587 ... 588) 
*** 
This chapter will scrutinize Nietzsche's conception of 
the utility of truth for life. An integral part of 
Nietzsche's consideration of truth as a "morale-value" is 
influenced by Nietzsche's notion of the nature of conscious-
ness as grounded in language. Nietzsche claims that humans 
are in the position of confusing the least real (language, 
logical systems) with the most real, (immediate, pre-
conceptual experience). It will be necessary to examine the 
ground of Nietzsche's claim as well as to take notice of the 
kind of evidence Nietzsche uses as the basis for these 
thoughts. First, however, it is imperative that we consider 
Nietzsche's conception of words and their relationship to 
consciousness. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes: 
Now, if you are willing to listen to my answer 
and the perhaps extravagant surmise that it involves, 
it seems to me as if the subtlety and strength of 
consciousness always were proportionate to a man's 
(or animal's) capacity of communication, and as if 
this capacity in turn were proportionate to the need 
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for communication ... Man, like every living being 
thinks continually without even knowing it; the 
thinking that rises to consciousness is only the 
smallest part of all this--the most superficial 
and worst part--for only the conscious thinking 
takes the form of words, which is to say signs 
of communication, and this fact uncovers the origin 
of consciousness ... My idea, as you see, that 
consciousness does not really belong to man's 
individual existence but rather to his social or 
herd nature ... Fundamentally, all our actions are 
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and 
infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. 
But as soon as we translate them into consciousness 
they no longer seem to be. (GS 354) 
Nietzsche thinks that humanity, in its need to communicate 
about the world and itself, was forced out of necessity to 
adopt the reality of the reference of words, ignoring the 
individuality of all experiences so as to communicate a 
general intersubjective understanding of these alleged 
unities. If it did not, humanity could not find out about 
danger, where to get food, etc. Yet Nietzsche asserts that 
before conscious "'thinking' there must have been 
'invention', the construction of identical cases, of the 
appearance of sameness, as it [construction of identical 
cases] is more primitive than the knowledge of sameness" (WP 
544). As mentioned in chapter two and four, humanity 
"falsifies" by adopting a criterion by which it 
distinguishes "being" from "non-being". Assuming the 
reality of an outside world of being without knowing it, 
conscious thinking never touches on reality, as the truth 
wielded in language schema is in "the most fundamental cases 
only the posture of various errors in relation to one 
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another" (WP 535). As a consequence, the words which we 
have are wornout metaphors which are not real and Nietzsche 
goes so far as to call them "vulgar", as they channel our 
thoughts and distract us by deceiving us about ourselves and 
the world. As "proof", Nietzsche provides us with the 
following incident: 
I caught this insight on the way and quickly seized 
the rather poor words that were closest to hand to pin 
it down lest it fly away again. And now it has died of 
these arid words and shakes and flaps in them--and I 
hardly know any more when I look at it how I could have 
felt so happy when I caught this bird (GS 298). 
Moreover, the only birds which can really be caught by the 
hand are those which can no longer fly: 
Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted 
thoughts! It was not long ago that you were still so 
colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and 
secret spices--you made me sneeze and laugh--and now? 
You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you 
are ready, I fear to become truths: they already look 
so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! ... Alas, 
always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew 
astray and now can be caught by hand--by hand! We 
immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer--only 
weary mellow things! And it is only your afternoon, 
you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I 
have colors, many colors perhaps, many motley caresses 
and fifty yellows and browns and greens and reds: but 
nobody will guess from that how you looked in your 
morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, 
you my old beloved--wicked thoughts! (BGE 296) 
The above is the sort of evidence Nietzsche must use to 
ground his claims about the "vulgarity" or ultimate 
unreality of words. Nietzsche is in the position of wanting 
to make a claim about the pre-linguistic when the only 
medium he has through which to do it is obviously the 
linguistic. The only way which Nietzsche can object to the 
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structures by which we understand reality is to appeal to 
some instant where the structures of language do not "mesh" 
with experience. Nietzsche uses this experience (of having 
the ability to catch only flightless birds through words) to 
try to show that the logico-linguistic structures by which 
we understand the world clash with the reality of pre-
linguistic experience. 
If one considers Nietzsche's incapacity to catch "birds 
in flight", and looks for some sort of status in its 
epistemological grounding, Nietzsche appears to be taking a 
stance which cannot be defended by providing other reasons 
to justify his case in that Nietzsche either had such 
experiences (and they mean what he thinks they mean) or he 
did not. There is no more rationale that he is capable of 
giving to justify his conclusion, as he is at the end of the 
"epistemic rope". For Nietzsche to have a correct 
"intuition" into this realm, not only does such experience 
have to "be there" but we must also assume that Nietzsche is 
not simply deluded or unable to use language correctly which 
1s, in spite of what Nietzsche thinks, able to, in 
principle, pin down "the bird in flight". 
Insofar as Nietzsche has a claim about reality which 
could be grounded epistemologically, he cannot be 
justified. Unfortunately for Nietzsche, he is trying to 
level an anti-conceptual claim about the conceptual world, 
so he has no means to prove his claim except by doing so 
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"indirectly". In appealing to his dissonant experience, he 
is again trying to stand before and outside the mechanics of 
epistemology, by showing that the entities that language and 
epistemology use are products of falsification and social 
convention. In the case of language, Nietzsche thinks we 
are in the process of making blunt unities out of all the 
various sharpnesses of our experiences. 
While Nietzsche is intentionally trying not to take an 
epistemological stance, he is doing so in a way which is 
different from his refusal to do so on knowledge as such. 
In the case of Nietzsche attacking Kant and claiming "there 
is no truth", Nietzsche is attacking internal flaws which 
are embedded in theories of knowledge; one cannot have 
"knowledge" of "knowledge" as one would have to suspend the 
conditions under which knowledge is normally possible if one 
were to do so. Nietzsche has more of a problem with 
attacking the dissonance between reality and language, as he 
cannot point to internal inconsistencies such as those that 
are existent in theories of truth with their alleged 
value-free claims of "real" being. What he must do is 
attack language from an external vantagepoint by showing 
that it doesn't "match up" with the immediacy of our 
experiences. Whichever approach he uses, Nietzsche still 
concludes that both in epistemology and language the 
starting points of reference are not pre-existently real and 
we are foolhardy if we think we are capable of making claims 
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about reality based upon these "tools": 
Parmenides said, "one cannot think of what is 
not"--we are at the other extreme, and say, what can be 
thought of must certainly be a fiction (WP 539) 
Conscious thought is sunk deeply in falsification ac-
cording to Nietzsche and it has been mistaken as the 
criterion of the real. The belief in language and logical 
systems as a measure of reality is thus a reversal in the 
most profound sense; philosophers have confused the "least 
real" with the "most real": 
Conscious thinking, especially that of the 
philosopher, is the least vigorous and therefore also 
the relatively mildest and calmest form of thinking; 
and thus precisely philosophers are most apt to be led 
astray about the nature of knowledge (GS 333). 
The Socratic maxims "virtue is knowledge; all sins arise 
from ignorance; only the virtuous are happy" (BT XIV) are 
not only "untrue" according to Nietzsche, but they have 
inculcated the prejudice that "the good" and "the true" are 
intimately related, thus cooking up obligatory force for 
themselves. Moreover, philosophers have completely imagined 
the reality of moral and truth values as existing prior to 
human falsification and thereby have put up bullwarks 
between themselves and the development of their 
interpretative skills. Worst of all is Nietzsche's portrait 
of the "wisest men of all ages", who have judged life alike: 
... it is no good. Always and everywhere one 
has heard the same from their mouths--a sound full 
of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness of 
life, full of resistance to life ... Formerly one 
would have said ... "At least some of all this must 
be true! The consensus of the sages evidences 
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the truth". Shall we still talk like that today? 
May we? "At least something must be sick here", 
we retort. These wisest men of all ages--they 
should be first scrutinized closely. Were they 
perhaps shaky on their legs? late? tottery? 
decadents? Could it be that wisdom appears on 
earth as a raven, inspired by a little whiff of 
carrion? (TI II 1) 
Nietzsche considers it imperative to create a new 
meaning against the "slanderers of this world". The 
platonic prejudice of the unreality of this earthly world 
must go, as should the supposition that reason-
virtue-happiness are connected for this is a sign of 
weakness and complaint against the richness and ambiguity 
which is characteristic of the chaotic flux of this world. 
While dialectics may wield powerful tools of reason, 
Nietzsche thinks they should not be turned to justify 
existence as they are humanity's weakest fictions. Not only 
have dialectics set the course of philosophy for two 
millenia, but their practicioners have declared themselves 
the very measure of reality. The henchmen of dialectics, 
(philosophers and priests) have baptized moral truths and 
alleged truths of "being" at the expense of the development 
of clean methodology. Even the Platonic/Christian god's 
signature of truth is not an excuse anymore, as Nietzsche 
claims that: 
It is no more than a moral prejudice that 
truth is worth more than appearance. (BGE 34) 
According to Nietzsche, philosophers hate "becoming", 
i.e. reality, as dialectics can only trap what has "being". 
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"When these honorable idolators of concepts worship some-
thing, they kill it, they threaten the life of everything 
they worship ... they all believe, desparately even, in what 
has being" (TI III 1). In the context of Nietzsche's 
thought, this is to do nothing less than turn one's back on 
the natural immediacy of the pre-conceptual. When Nietzsche 
diagnoses the "good of truth" as grounded in the least real 
fictions spilling into the "good of morals" and declaring 
itself as the most important and most real, he concludes 
that mankind is unique among the animals in his magnitude 
and capacity for self-torment: 
He projected all his denials of self, nature, 
naturalness out of himself as affirmations, as true 
being, embodiment, reality, as God (the divine judge 
and executioner), as transcendence, as eternity, as 
endless torture, as hell, as the infinitude of 
guilt and punishment. In such psychological 
cruelty we see an insanity of the will that is 
without parallel: Man's will to find himself 
guilty, and unredeemably so ... What a mad unhappy 
animal is man! (GM III 26) 
Imprisoned in his idol of truth, humanity thereby 
harbors a cerebral malice towards animality and what he has 
made of himself and his role in the world. Through the 
self-torment of repression humanity thus cultivates an inner 
hatred whose genesis is due to "the reversal of the 
evaluating look, this invariable looking outward instead of 
inward, ... a fundamental feature of rancor ... Physiologically 
speaking all its action is a reaction" (GM I 10). 
Nietzsche concludes that the course of philosophy in 
dealing with the imaginary world of truth has tried to hack 
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off the roots of mankind's unconscious and forbidden animal 
nature, making humans the "insane animal". By mistaking its 
own fictions for reality, humanity has made himself sick, 
branding evil and false that which is physiologically the 
closest. Humans are passively "nihilistic" in that the 
fictions in which they believe are grounded in nothing--the 
idols "known" as truths. The condition is made even more 
desparate because the seductive force of language even goes 
so far as to structure empirical reality to the extent that 
we cannot even realize that it controls the way we think and 
deal with the world. Yet mankind is not doomed. Nietzsche 
hinted that it is not too late to bestow meaning on this 
earth. It still can hope for salvation from the "slanderers 
of this world" in Dionysian art. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DIONYSIAN AFFIRMATION: IGNORING BEING 
An anti-metaphysical view of the world-- y es, but an 
artistic one.--The Will to Power (1048) 
*** 
The present inquiry so far has traced Nietzsche's 
development of the disavowal of the belief in truth which 
exists prior to human perspectival optics. Nietzsche has 
tried to expose all truth as mere idol or "the posture of 
v arious errors to one another " (WP 535). Some of these 
truths enhance man's "will to power" and are useful in 
making man stronger through the mastering of phenomena by 
positing beings, logic, and acquiring highly developed 
senses of causation. Yet these idols have also restricted 
growth and dampened vital energies by placing limits on 
humanity. This chapter will synopsize the logic of 
Nietzsche's assault on being and offer Nietzsche's answer to 
these worn-out metaphors, the nihilator par excellence, the 
tragic artist. 
The first five chapters of this inquiry present the 
logic of Nietzsche's rejection of truth: 
1. Mankind is born into a chaotic flux with no pre-existent 
being. This is the fundamental condition of existence. 
2. "Many hecatombs of human beings were sacrificed before 
these impulses learned to comprehend their coexistence and 
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to feel that they were all functions of one organizing force 
within one human being" (GS 113). Mankind bestows upon its 
members the belief in selfhood, thus making himself a 
"self"; the individual thus adopts the thereafter 
indispensible power-increasing fiction of the ego, creating 
and learning to view oneself as a powerful unity. 
3. Through individuals positing themselves as a unities, 
they are able to believe "unproblematically" in unities in 
general. Through language one communicates about the 
newfound "beings" which are found (or taken to be found) as 
real and existent in the world, independent of perception. 
4. Humans are able to reason about remote time and space 
and even "beings" as of yet unencountered. Incipit 
dialectics, a highly proficient mechanical application which 
wields knowledge of the relations among his fictitious 
unities. Here humans come to develop a sense of and for 
truth. 
5. Truth about the world is spilled into the truths about 
morality, the way things "ought to be": rational, 
unanimalistic. Truth commands an obligatory force and turns 
on the spontaneity and healthiness of mankind's instinctual 
animal past. "The wells of Eros" are poisoned by a carnally 
unbegotten prophet, the son of God. Christianity adopts the 
Platonic god of ultimate rationality who guarantees the 
veracity of being and mankind is no longer an animal free to 
roam amongst its immediate instinctual nature, i.e. that 
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which was originally and is primally the condition of 
existence. Torn between beast and God, the idol demands 
revolt against the primal nature and humanity becomes 
psychologically and physiologically "sick". 
At this point humanity is paralyzed in its ability to 
create a better understanding of the world which could 
relinquish itself from self-inflicted madness. Philosophers 
can provide no answers as they have already accepted the 
given reality of "being" and its consequential reality to 
justify existence. They are especially unable to do so 
because they are "the sober, the weary, the exhausted" 
precisely because they are at home only in the dialectical 
world of the exchange of "real" ideas. Like computers, they 
are only able to operate proficiently with their 
pre-programmed static concepts of logical dualism and are 
therefore unable to generate new interpretations. The 
smell, sound, and sight of this prompts Nietzsche to 
conclude that they are the farthest from reality and in lieu 
of looking to philosophers for an understanding of life, he 
offers the tragic wisdom of Dionysian art. 
While Nietzsche shifted his early epistemological 
stance in regards to Dionysian art as a keyhole to peak into 
the noumena (as outlined in chapter three), Nietzsche's 
Dionysos (in spite of other transformations in the character 
of Dionysos in Nietzsche's thought) represents the tragic 
artist who can stand in the midst of the terrifying and the 
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uncertain fearlessly, and even prefer the uncertainty and 
terror which constitute the conditions of life and therefore 
the nature of Nietzschean reality. The Dionysian artist 
spontaneously affirms life with a superabundance of 
animalistic and human energy rather than hiding behind the 
illusory shield of dialectics. He has the courage to stand 
without the need or want of the reactionary fiction of the 
contrivances of rationality to justify existence. 
Nietzsche obviously thinks that not all art is 
Dionysian and insofar as the artist annihilates being by 
substituting art for truth Nietzsche elucidates: 
The desire for destruction, change, becoming can be 
the expression of an overfull power pregnant with the 
future (my term, for this, as is known is the word 
"Dionysian"); but it can also be hatred of the 
ill-constituted, disinhereited, underprivileged, which 
destroys, has to destroy, because what exists, indeed 
existence itself, all being itself, enrages it, provokes 
it. (WP 846) 
Nietzsche's Dionysian is not resentful towards the world nor 
reactionary, but spontaneously creates and affirms his 
life-instincts. In contrast to the "Inartistic states: 
those of objectivity, mirroring, suspended will", 
Nietzsche's artist stands prior to the fictions of "being" 
and could not be concerned with the way things (allegedly) 
are. Moreover, Nietzsche asserts that "to demand of the 
artist that he should practice the perspective of the 
audience (Of the critic--) [is] ... to demand that he should 
impoverish himself and his creative power" (WP 811). Here 
we can see that Nietzsche's tragic hero as creator in a 
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sense does not "know what he's doing". Here lies part of 
his "tragicness", in that he is like a child who doesn't yet 
understand what he should and shouldn't do because he is 
unfamiliar with "the way things are". He is therefore often 
the victim of his own undoing. 
Nietzsche characterizes the non-dionysian artist as one 
who has not only his "artistic" perspective, but also the 
perspective of his audience. The reason that this might 
make for a more socially-dictated "successful" artist is 
that he knows how his work will be viewed by the public. 
Yet, according to Nietzsche, this is precisely what makes 
him inferior as an artist. Once he puts himself in the eye 
of the audience's perspective, his work becomes concerned 
with evoking responses of religious fervor, nationalism, 
seduction of women, etc. He puts himself at the mercy of 
the "all too human" world which brings its own slant into 
interpretation and thus loses his spontanaeity. The 
non-dionysian's art becomes a means to some other end and he 
no longer can stand outside the logic of interpretative 
schema. 
Logically speaking, if one is going to use the word 
"creation" in the sense of making "something" come out of 
"nothing", no one should be able to create, as the "reality 
of being" in logical dualism has no transition stage between 
"something" and "nothing"; either something "is" or it "is 
not" and the only way in which we can posit the existence of 
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unities as existent is to understand the difference between 
"when something is" and "when something is not". Yet this 
is precisely how the Dionysian artist can create. He does 
not understand or simply chooses to ignore "being" as ready 
made. Prior to belief in the obligation to recognize the 
difference between "being" and "nonbeing", he freely 
arranges "being" and thereby creates his own unities, 
"making up" the very structure by which reality is to be 
interpreted himself. By not knowing or at least not 
believing in the importance or the "reality" of "how things 
are", he is able to arrange and construct the way he 
interprets reality and thus manifest this interpretation in 
his art, logically (or illogically) prior to the being of 
logical dualism itself. Thus the artist becomes like a god 
or God--or whoever is entitled to create and sanction a new 
meaning in the world. Moreover, he does this "out of 
nothing" but his abundance of life-affirming creative 
energy. 
Nietzsche views God as the archenemy of art for "God's 
absolute truth relegates all art to the realm of falsehood 
and in so doing condemns it" (BT later preface II). As a 
consequence, Nietzsche believes the development of mankind's 
creative faculties have been all but pre-empted and beaten 
into near nonexistence by the obligatory idol of truth. 
Nietzsche plays with his irony of a fiction which demands 
the unreality of other fictions: 
65 
It was the greatest of rebaptisms; and because it 
has been adopted by Christianity we do not recognize how 
astonishing it is. Fundamentally, Plato, as the artist 
he was, preferred appearance to being! lie and 
invention to truth! the unreal to the actual! But he 
was so convinced of the value of appearance that he gave 
it the attributes "being", "causality", and "goodness" 
and "truth", in short everything men value. (WP 572) 
Nietzsche further paints his own history of the "true 
world" and how it "became a fable" in Twilight of the 
Idols: 
The History of an Error 
1. The true world--attainable for the sage, the 
p ious, the virtuous man; he lives it, he is it. 
(The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, 
simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the 
sentence, "I Plato, am the truth.") 
2. The true world--unattainable for now, but 
promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for 
the sinner who repents"). 
(Progress of the idea: it becomes female, it becomes 
Christian) . 
3. The true world--unattainable, indemonstrable, 
unpromisable; but the thought of it--a consolation, an 
obligation, an imperative. 
(At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and 
skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, 
Konigsbergian) 
4. The true world--unattainable? At any rate, 
unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, 
redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown 
obligate us? 
(Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow 
of positivism) 
5. The true world--an idea which is no longer good 
for anything, not even obligating--an idea which has 
become useless and superfluous--consequently a refuted 
idea: let us abolish it! 
(Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and 
cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of 
all free spirits) 
6. The true world--we have abolished. What world 
has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With 
the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. 
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest 
error; highpoint of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) 
(TI IV) 
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Thus Nietzsche gives us the history of philosophy as a 
fiction, a fable, an artwork which is finally to be 
recognized as such. Moreover, Nietzsche's "proof" lies in 
his own unabashed writing of philosophy as art--or perhaps 
it just lies. 
After his mischief of denying the reality of the ego, 
things-in-themselves, truth, and morality, Nietzsche thus 
leaves us with art as "the cult of the untrue" as a hint as 
to where we may look for the nature of reality, for 
philosophy is over. If we take Nietzsche seriously perhaps 
we should either not listen to him or consider exchanging 
our wornout metaphors for the not yet created. For those of 
us who may have followed Nietzsche's dance through the 
absence of ultimate obligatory truth both in being and 
morality, Nietzsche parts leaving the illusory vanishing 
smoke of art standing both before and amidst truth as man's 
ultimate reality--by default! Even for those amongst us who 
think Nietzsche is simply insane and breathes rantings of 
delusions stirred on by syphillitic, schizophrenic dementia, 
perhaps we can still yet welcome the will not to slander 
life: 
There is much filth in the world; that much is true. 
But that does not make the world a filthy monster. 
[Thus spake Zarathustra] (Z III 14) 
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